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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2980  
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001176

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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA  
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24  
CIA FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP  
MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-090.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: December 02, 2009  
Time: 16:00 P.M. - 18:00 P.M.  
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) The discussion during this session of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) focused on Article XI of the treaty and Section VII of the Protocol. Regarding Article XI, Col Ilin asserted that confirmation of the elimination of strategic offensive arms (SOA) should be conducted as a Type 2 inspection rather than as an exhibition. Additionally, he stressed there was a need for Russia to conduct inspections to confirm that U.S. ICBM launchers had not been converted to perform a missile defense role. The discussion of Section VII of the Protocol concerned the names of the types of inspections provided for in Sections VI and VII of the Protocol and, removing mention of any facilities associated with mobile launchers of ICBMs from the Type 2 inspections. End Summary.

[1](#)4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Two Main Issues In Article XI; Section VII of The Protocol: What to Call Inspections and Discussion of Facilities for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs; and Wrap-Up.

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TWO MAIN ISSUES IN ARTICLE XI  
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15. (S) Col Ilin stated that the Russian delegation was instructed to work to achieve agreement on treaty Article XI text. He said there were two main issues in Article XI: 1) whether the confirmation of elimination of SOA would be conducted in the inspection of non-deployed systems or as an exhibition, making clear the Russian side wants these inspection activities to be Type 2 inspections and thus counted against the annual Type 2 quota; and 2) resolution of the issue of inspection of missiles and launchers to see whether they had been converted to a missile defense role. He stressed that it was important to prove that ICBMs had not been converted to missile defense interceptors. Ilin stated there could be no more progress on Article XI without resolution of the missile defense issue. Dr. Warner commented that the issue had to be discussed at the level of Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov. He had no authorization to resolve the offense-defense issue. He asked why the Russians felt there should be a display of defensive interceptors in a treaty on SOA; he received no response. Warner provided the Russians a revised joint draft text of Article XI for their review. After the discussion, Warner agreed that the major differences over Article XI concerned whether eliminations should be verified in Type 2 inspections or in exhibitions and the differences of the Parties over inspection for conversion of ICBMs to a missile defense role.

16. (S) Ilin then offered what he called a "revolutionary proposal," to retain only the first agreed paragraph in Article XI as the entirety of Article XI and to move all of the remaining text to the Inspection Activities Protocol. Warner replied that such a move would not solve the problem, but only "sweep it under the carpet." In any event, he would have to discuss this with the members of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group. Regarding the unsolved issue of eliminations, Warner opined that the Type 2 inspection quota would have to be increased significantly if eliminations were included in Type 2 inspections, even though the eliminations could be done in batches. Ilin questioned whether the United States was going to conduct eliminations of SOA. He said if the United States was not going to conduct eliminations the provisions on elimination inspections would be a one-sided measure, unfair to the Russian Federation. Warner said the United States may eliminate some SOA to get under the strategic delivery vehicle limit envisioned for START Follow-on (SFO). Warner requested that the Russian delegation consider a more complete Article XI than their proposed single paragraph and stated that the U.S. Senate would demand to see the key aspects of the verification provisions spelled out in the Protocol.

17. (S) Referring to paragraph 2 of an earlier Russian-proposed version of Article XI, Warner pointed out the inappropriateness of including non-nuclear armaments on heavy bombers as items of inspection under the Type 1 inspection at heavy bomber bases. Ilin closed the discussion of Article XI by promising to either reduce some of the text in Article XI or to continue to propose that only the first paragraph be retained as the entirety of Article XI.

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SECTION VII OF THE PROTOCOL: WHAT TO CALL INSPECTIONS  
AND DISCUSSION OF FACILITIES MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS  
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18. (S) Before moving on to the discussion of Section VII, Ilin provided a copy of paragraph 11 of Section V for the United States to review and consider. The discussion of Section VII began with each side expressing differing opinions on the names to be used to refer to the type of inspections in Section VII and, by inference, also Section

VI. The United States proposed using short references to Type 1 and Type 2 inspections whereas Russia stated the desire to retain the more lengthy titles in the draft sections. Warner stressed that the U.S. TTDWG had serious concerns regarding the descriptions of the inspection activities and that he would have to continue to coordinate with them. Turning to substantive issues in paragraph 1, progress was made in deleting the Russian text calling for Type 2 inspection of submarine bases and in removing brackets from the listing of most types of facilities subject to the Type 2 inspection. However, Ilin insisted in deleting references to inspection of repair facilities, storage facilities and conversion and elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs claiming that a general reference to SOA was sufficient instead of the detailed list. He also suggested using a simple reference to "facilities as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)." Warner reminded Ilin that there are too many items listed in the MOU to make

use of such a general reference; the facilities subject to type 2 inspection need to be listed in Section VII. Warner pointed out that the text listing facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs came from Russian text. Nevertheless, Ilin insisted all references to mobile launchers of ICBMs be placed in brackets, thereby winning what Warner described as the award for "the silliest brackets placed in SFO text." In further discussion of paragraph 1 of Section VII, it was agreed to re-insert the reference to inspection of formerly declared facilities.

¶9. (S) Turning to other paragraphs of Section VII, it was agreed that paragraphs 3, 3a, 3b, and 4 were mutually satisfactory as currently written. When the discussion of paragraph 5 began, Ilin insisted that the discussion of reading the data from unique identifiers on SOA should be moved to the third level, that is, the Inspection Activities Annex.

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WRAP-UP  
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¶10. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to stop at this point in the review. Ilin stated the working group would resume the discussion at paragraph 5 of Section VII during the next meeting. Warner stated that the IPWG needed to conduct two meetings per day to make sufficient progress to meet the goal of finishing the documents.

¶11. (S) (Begin comment: A few hours after completing this session, Col Ilin informed the U.S. side that the Russian side agreed to remove the various brackets on "mobile launchers of ICBMs." End comment.)

¶12. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- Joint Draft Text of Article XI, dated December 2, ¶2009.

- RUSSIA:

-- Draft of paragraph 11, Section V, dated December 2, ¶2009.

¶13. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner  
Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. Celusnak  
Maj. Johnson  
LTC Leyde  
Mr. McConnell  
Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust  
Mr. Sims  
Mr. Smith  
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col. Ilin  
Ms. Vodopolova  
Mr. Izrazov  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS